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An accumulated wrong: Roger Casement and the anticolonial 
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Abstract 
Taking three moments of governance - executive, legislative, judicial - this paper explains how 
forms of anticolonial critique were composed and articulated within the general regime of 
imperial rule. Through the career of Roger Casement, this paper shows how international human 
rights could develop out of the administration of empires as they monitored and compared the 
treatment of their own subjects in other imperial spaces. Casement drew particularly on his Irish 
heritage to identify the expropriation of direct producers as the basis of colonial rule. For 
Casement, colonialism was coeval with the destruction of native life. This was a far more 
systematic critique than was typical in commentary on the evils of colonialism. It finally impelled 
Casement into open rebellion giving him one last opportunity, from the dock as a convicted 
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The contribution of radical thinkers to the criticism of imperialism from the last half of the 
nineteenth century has been highlighted by historians such Bernard Porter and Gregory Claeys. 
Indebted though we are to this work, our concern here is less with this genealogy of ideas than 
with the practical elaboration of anticolonial criticism within the spaces of colonial governance. 
While scholars draw upon the contents of parliamentary debates, blue book inquiries, and 
judicial reviews in studies of anticolonial movements, less attention has been paid to the spaces 
of governance themselves as distinctive sites of anticolonial praxis.1 The executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of governance were each engaged with colonialism. Each had its own sites, 
discourses and geographies and on every surface we find the fissures and cracks that register the 
fundamental fragility of colonial power. One set of vulnerabilities was produced by the tensions 
between legitimation and publicity, and this set of anticolonial possibilities could be made 
manifest even at the heart of empire. The spatial complexity of colonial discourse is noted in 
much recent anthropology and historical geography, leading Catherine Nash to remark on 
colonialism’s ‘complex, shifting and ambiguous social relations’, acknowledging that its power 
was contested both centre and periphery. Similarly Alan Lester and Fae Dussart point to the 
networks of resistance and solidarity forged between Aboriginal people and their metropolitan 
allies.2 Building on this critical work we view the structures and processes of governance as ripe 
for repurposing, and in some cases capable of elaborating a powerful critique of colonialism.  
As part of the executive, British colonial administration involved many agencies and it 
was formally answerable to parliament through questions to a responsible minister, calls for 
publication of official correspondence, the commissioning of inquiries, and the publication of 
reports from appointed committees. Moreover, the legislative function of parliament is practised 
across a range of sites including its debating chambers, committee rooms and conferences, not 
to mention epistolary and less formal communicative networks that are central to governmental 
deliberation. Similarly, judicial power includes sites of custody, interrogation, public hearing, 
incarceration and execution. Throughout, the power relations between the coloniser and the 
colonised are uneven, although at many of these sites of colonial power a certain (circumscribed) 
publicity and voice might be exercised by subalterns and their supporters. This paper attends to 
the anticolonial public voice of Roger Casement as it was expressed in and through many of 
these sites. 
Casement was born in 1864 into a Protestant family in Sandycove, County Dublin.3 From 
1883 to 1891, he was employed by commercial ventures in West Africa. In 1892 he began work 
for the British Foreign Office and from 1895 as British consul. With interruptions for leave and 
recuperation, he served in this way until 1913 when he retired on medical grounds at the age of 
49.4 Knighted for his service, the highlights of his official career were the reports and campaigns 
exposing the abuse of indigenous labour in rubber extraction in Congo – based on a journey in 
1903, published as a report in 1904 – and the Amazon – based on visits of 1909-1910, a report 
submitted in 1911 and published in 1912. In retirement, he devoted himself to the cause of Irish 
independence, organizing gun running, recruiting for the Irish Volunteers, fund-raising in the 
United States, and, with the outbreak of the First World War, soliciting German support for an 
independent Irish state.5 Apprehended after having been landed near Tralee from a German 
submarine, he was taken to London, put on trial for treason, and hanged at Pentonville, 3 
August 1916 – the last of the sixteen Irish rebels to be executed in that year, and the only one to 
be hanged. 
Our paper begins with colonial administration as part of the executive moment of 
governance and considers how Casement’s experience in Congo was given affective force by his 
developing understanding of British misrule in Ireland. He began by investigating the abuse of 
native labour and very soon raised the question in a way that questioned colonial dispossession 
itself. Next, we turn to the legislative moment of governance and track Casement’s evidence 
within the parliamentary debates they helped animate back in London. We show how a broad 
assault upon colonialism tout court flourished in spite of the specific constraints of parliamentary 
protocol. Finally, when Casement moved from colonial critic to anticolonial rebel, he was caught 
up within the third moment of imperial governance when subjected to the judicial powers of the 
British state under a charge of treason. Here again, the specific forms of discourse placed 
constraints upon what could be said or heard and Casement was advised to avoid speaking in his 
defence for fear that he would be smeared with talk about his queer sexuality. Yet, after 
conviction and in the pause before execution, Casement joined the long tradition of Irish rebels 
bringing eloquence to the dock of a British courtroom. In his final public address he generalised 
his anticolonial critique as a gospel of love and solidarity that still echoes in global human rights 
discourse today. 
THE CONGO REPORT 
European colonialism in the Congo is a tale of rapine, slaughter, dissimulation and hypocrisy.6 At 
the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the European Great Powers plus the United States of 
America allowed that, in the interests of suppressing slavery and ensuring free trade for all, the 
Congo would be administered by a philanthropic company under the personal direction of the 
king of Belgium. Although a constitutional monarch, Leopold II acted as absolute sovereign in 
the Congo Free State, even retaining a significant part (Domaine de la Couronne) as a personal 
domain and part-ownership of some of the companies granted concessions (Figure 1).7 Assisting 
the anti-slavery and aborigine protection societies, the Berlin Conference drew attention to 
human rights abuses by colonial powers.8 In 1897, Charles Dilke, a radical MP and member of 
the Liberal Party, asked in the House of Commons for a further conference of the Powers to 
verify if parties had met their treaty obligations of ‘preserv[ing] the native populations, [and] 
improv[ing] their moral and material conditions’. One of Dilke’s charges was that the Belgian 
king had, by secret edict, claimed all ‘lands in which there was not private property[,] which was 
not known to the aborigines’.9 The vacant lands doctrine (vacuum domicilium) was part of British 
colonial practice and, as S.J.S Cookey points out, something similar ‘soon came to be adopted by 
[other] colonial powers in Equatorial Africa’.10 While the Congo was supposed to have been 
managed differently, the land grab was actually so extensive that it left indigenous people little 
beyond the garden plots abutting their villages.11 Replying for the government, George Curzon 
denied that they must ‘act as guardians of the public trust imposed on the Congo State’.12  
In 1898, Casement was sent as consul to the Portuguese colony of Angola. Congo was 
the neighbour to the north, and when the British vice-consul there resigned, Casement was 
drawn into its affairs. Initially Casement’s primary concern was with ‘“British colonial natives” 
from West Africa’ who had been employed in rubber extraction and had been treated brutally, 
but he soon began reporting on the rubber trade more generally, citing the testimony of US 
missionaries who accused the Congo State of murdering those who refused corvée labour.13  His 
trade reports were public documents and were discussed in newspapers, but in parliament the 
government was not disposed to investigate, suggesting that if US citizens had representations to 
make those ‘would naturally be made through their own Government’. Henry Morton Stanley, 
who had been repeatedly involved with Belgian and British ventures in the region – two of 
which were in service of the personal colonial ambitions of Leopold II – spoke up as MP for 
Lambeth North, interrupting a debate on Uganda to assert that ‘there is not one word of truth, 
not one solid fact, to bear out the statement that the administration of the Congo has been either 
disastrous or one of evil example’. In reply, citing a paper presented at the Royal Geographical 
Society, Dilke raised the specific case of Congo State soldiers raiding cattle and women, and 
killing men in the British protectorate of Uganda.14 On this occasion the government was 
content that the Congo State had promised to ‘punish the offenders severely if the offence is 
brought home to them’.15  
By 1902, Casement was also acting as US consul for the Congo and an American 
missionary, William Morrison, brought him reports of violence by Congo State forces against 
indigenous people. Casement ensured that these documents and allegations reached the Foreign 
Office. In a memorandum of February 1903, Casement repeated Dilke’s arguments for a new 
meeting of the Powers who endorsed the Berlin Act. He also questioned the right of the Belgian 
king to take land since the monarch held only treaty rights and not sovereignty.  He argued that 
in the Congo the ‘Chief is only the trustee of the tribal family, and his public rights are well 
defined and strictly limited by popular control’, and these rights did not include the alienation of 
occupied lands.16 
In March 1903 in the House of Commons, Dilke again asked in vain that the signatories 
to the Berlin Act reconvene. Later that same month, the government described reports of cruelty 
from consular officers as ‘not very complete’, and two months later declined to publish 
Casement’s incomplete reports, explaining that ‘for various reasons he has been unable to travel 
to such an extent as to enable him to form anything like a full opinion on the condition of the 
State’.17 On 20 May 1903, evidence from Morrison was read into the record of the House of 
Commons by Herbert Samuel when moving successfully a motion that the government discuss 
with the other Berlin signatories ‘measures [that] may be adopted to abate the evils prevalent in 
[the Congo] State’. In the course of the debate, Dilke requested that reports from the consul 
should be shared with parliament, and on this occasion the government replied that the Congo 
was very big and that the consul, Casement, was based on the coast. The prime minister, Arthur 
Balfour, secured the removal from the motion of a ‘condemnation’ of the Congo government, 
on the grounds that parliament, in the absence of ‘anything in the nature of judicial inquiry’, 
should not base charges ‘merely upon statements made in debate’.18 Nevertheless, the 
government was bound by the motion to solicit the assistance of the co-signatories of the Berlin 
Act in bringing before the Congo government its failures, which it did on 8 August 1903. Yet, as 
of November 1906 no active support had been offered in response.19 At the same time, 
Casement had requested permission to investigate the upper Congo but, as late as 8 May 1903 
when he telegraphed London with his intention of doing so, he was told to wait.20 Permission 
came in early June and, tellingly, Casement later claimed that it only did so ‘in view of the debate 
of May 1903’.21 
Casement spent two and a half months in the Upper Congo. After a train journey from 
Matadi to Leopoldville, he spent much of June around Stanley Pool, before departing for the 
Upper Congo on 2 July.22 With a native interpreter, Nsala, and an English Baptist missionary, 
Albert E. Scrivener, he interviewed refugees who had fled villages now claimed as the private 
property of the Belgian monarch.23 Moving upriver he collected testimony alleging forced labour, 
aborted food cultivation, population loss, rape, torture and mutilation. After spending a few 
weeks in and around the Domaine de la Couronne, Casement moved further upriver to the lands 
held by the ABIR Concession Company and spent part of late August and early September at 
Bongadanga before returning downstream and back to Brazzaville by 15 September. He sought 
corroboration for the most extreme allegations and on one occasion he confronted a perpetrator 
with their victim. Taking his lead from journalist Edmund Dene Morel’s analysis of Congo trade, 
Casement consulted trade statistics that showed extensive exports, balanced by minimal imports, 
with the signal exception of the introduction of more guns.24 He compared what he now found 
in the Upper Congo with his own observations from 1887, ‘and was thus able to institute a 
comparison between a state of affairs ... when the natives lived ... uncontrolled by Europeans, 
and that created by more than a decade of very energetic European intervention’.25 His letters 
alarmed staff at the Foreign Office with one official annoyed by his ‘exuberant diction’ and 
another disturbed by ‘violent diatribes against the Congo State which he has no evidence to 
support’.26 He was recalled to London so that he might write up his report under the calming 
tutelage of civil servants. 
From November 1903 until publication in February 1904, the official process of drafting 
and revision exasperated Casement and he contemplated resigning when the published report 
omitted the names and locations of African witnesses. He had wanted only the names of the 
local officials of the Congo State omitted: to prevent reprisals against them, but also so that he 
might indict a regime rather than individual rogues.27 In other cases, the revisions implied that 
matters reported to and verified by Casement were little more than hearsay. This allowed 
Constantine Phipps, the Foreign Office representative in Belgium, to temper the force of the 
report with the observation that although it was an official document, it was merely the opinion 
of one man. Nevertheless, when the Belgian king attacked Casement’s integrity, Phipps 
suggested that the Foreign Office publish the additional atrocity stories it had reserved on file.28  
Despite the moderating influence of editing from the Foreign Office, Casement’s report 
was severe. He described the military violence used to extract food and other supplies and 
documented one case where seventeen villagers were killed, forty-eight goats were taken, several 
houses were torched and sixteen further goats extracted for the repatriation of ten villagers 
seized as hostages. Following representation from Casement and a claim of compensation to the 
amount of 3,586 Belgian francs (about £142 at the time), 950 fr. was paid by the officer 
responsible, although Casement ‘could not learn what other form of punishment, if any, was 
inflicted on this officer’.29 There are many specific atrocities recounted in the report but 
Casement insisted that it was a system he was attacking. Indeed, one British civil servant 
expressed his irritation by annotating one letter from Casement: ‘He has the system on the 
brain’.30 Yet Casement persisted, and a focus upon system became common currency in the full 
range of discourse upon the Congo ‘in Memorials from philanthropic Societies, in 
communications from commercial bodies in the public press, and in despatches from His 
Majesty’s Consuls’.31 It was central when the British government wrote to the co-signatories of 
the Berlin Act in 1904, and was the first item mentioned when the Congo government formally 
denied that ‘the manner in which the [Congo] State is administered involves a systematic regime 
“of cruelty or oppression”’.32 In parliament in 1907 a former foreign secretary described the 
Congo State as an ‘odious system of terrorism’.33  
Naked coercion, not market exchange, defined King Leopold’s rule. In one region, 
Casement estimated that in return for an annual rubber levy of £52, trade goods were exchanged 
to the value of £1.25.34 At another place, an American missionary reported a conversation with 
the chief state prosecutor, who admitted that ‘The only way to get rubber is to fight for it. … 
[T]he amount of rubber is controlled by the number of guns, and not the number of bales of 
cloth’.35 The Belgians employed Africans as soldiers but strictly limited their access to 
ammunition, and the prosecutor added that:  
‘Each time the corporal goes out to get rubber, cartridges are given to him. 
He must bring back all not used; and for every one used he must bring back a 
right hand’. … [H]e informed me that in six months they, the State, on the 
Momboyo River, had used 6,000 cartridges.36 
In interviews with refugees who had fled the rubber district, Casement was told that some of the 
African soldiers supplied different proof of slaughter: 
[Nkwabali]: The white men told their soldiers: ‘You kill only women; you 
cannot kill men. You must prove that you kill men. So then the soldiers when 
they killed us’ (here he hesitated, and then pointing to the private parts of my 
bulldog – it was lying asleep at my feet), he said: ‘then they cut off those 
things and took them to the white men, who said: “It is true, you have killed 
men.”’37 
This was violence, so Casement insisted, enacted by soldiers of the State, nominally in the 
extraction of a legal tax. The tax was paid in rubber and food, ‘collected by the agents of a 
trading firm, and figured as the outcome of their trade dealings with the people’. The violence of 
the arrangement mocked any pretence to free trade, or to humanitarianism on the part of the 
Congo Free State. The identity of military and commercial activity was complete. Casement 
quoted a government circular to its officers that instructed them to police the quality of rubber 
extraction and enjoined ‘constant supervision[, which] is necessary, for as soon as the native 
notices that the supervision is becoming lax he will lessen his work’. Casement concluded with 
evident understatement: ‘The instructions ... would be excellent if coming from the head of a 
trading house to his subordinates, but addressed, as they are, by a Governor-General to the 
principle officers of his administration, they reveal a somewhat limited conception of public 
duty’.38 In his own correspondence with the governor-general of the Congo State, Casement 
evoked a ‘system of general exploitation of an entire population which can only be rendered 
successful by the employment of arbitrary and illegal force’.39 
FROM THE CONGO FREE STATE TO ANNEXATION 
The report as it stood in December 1903 was forwarded to the Congo government. They 
rejected it suggesting both that it was part of a ‘campaign of calumny and defamation by the 
merchants of Liverpool’, who wanted the Congo rubber for themselves, and that it had ‘no 
confidence in the Casement report’ since neither dates nor locations were given for the 
mutilations alleged.40 The British pressured Leopold II to make public his own commission on 
Casement’s charges and thus, while Casement was in London, his temporary replacement as 
consul in Congo was required to attend the hearings. Unfortunately the commission held many 
of its hearings before it permitted the consul to attend, and when its report was published no 
evidence was provided in support of the exonerations it offered.41  
Tales of mutilation were a staple of reports from missionaries in the Congo before and 
after Casement’s investigation. One Baptist missionary, Daniel Danielsen, skippered the vessel 
that took Casement around the Upper Congo, and ‘used his journey with Casement to take some 
of the earliest atrocity photos’, which he used after his return to Scotland ‘to illustrate his 
November 1903 lectures’ on the Congo.42 Another missionary, Joseph Clark, had, in 1901, sent 
to the governor-general of the Congo State, a photograph of a boy, Mola, who had been maimed 
to the extent of both hands having been beaten off with rifle butts, and the only 
acknowledgment received was a notification in the Belgian press ‘to the effect that an American 
missionary was going about with a faked-up photograph’.43 Other missionaries, such as Alice 
Seely Harris and Danielsen, were largely responsible for the photographs used in Morel’s King 
Leopold’s Rule in Africa (1904), Mark Twain’s satirical King Leopold’s Soliloquy (1905), Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s The Crime of the Congo (1909), and in the hundreds of lectures given by returned 
missionaries themselves.44 Casement included none of these photographs in his reports, although 
he did deliver some from missionaries to their offices in London.45 However, the ways in which 
such photographs established a new standard of verisimilitude was important in the reception of 
his report; and significantly, in his later investigation into rubber extraction in the Amazonian 
district of Putumayo, Casement included many of his own.46 
The executive and legislative moments of governance are linked in part by the discussion 
in parliament of official reports. Yet publicity was also central to these legislative proceedings, 
and from the widening of the franchise in 1832 the British parliament became increasingly 
subject to ‘pressure from without’.47 During the period when he was writing his report, 
Casement made contact with journalists and activists. He successfully urged at least some of the 
missionaries in the Congo to challenge the strategy of their church leaders who had been willing 
to trade silence for access.48 His crucial ally in this public campaign was Morel whom he 
persuaded to lead it: ‘I said that if the Congo question was to be made a living one, it must be 
taken out of the hands of the Foreign Office and Government and made a people’s question – 
and ... I said to you “Thou art the man”!’ Morel got the same advice from a civil servant at the 
Foreign Office: ‘If you drop the Congo question, be sure the government will drop it’. With 
Casement’s close help (and indeed a donation of £100, one-third of his annual income), Morel 
set up the Congo Reform Association (CRA), ‘one of the most effective propaganda instruments 
in the twentieth century’.49 In one parliamentary debate, the foreign secretary observed that: ‘I 
think it is not too much to say no external question for at least thirty years moved the country so 
strongly, so vehemently, as this in regard to the Congo’.50 The discussion of the Congo Question 
in parliament was repeatedly incited by the activism of the CRA, producing no fewer than 
fourteen debates.51 In turn, these parliamentary speeches were reported in the national and 
international press. During one debate in the House of Lords, the archbishop of Canterbury 
‘rejoice[d] to think that the speeches delivered here this evening will find an echo outside, ... not 
least in Belgium itself’.52 When a royal commission on the civil service put it to him that ‘in 
connection with your reports, ... important inquiries in regard to rubber in the Congo took 
place’, Casement was quick to protest: ‘No ... – in consequence really of the public feeling raised 
by public reports outside’.53  
Despite its lobbying, the British government failed to get other states to join an 
international convention on the Berlin Act and would contemplate no autonomous action. 
Gunboat diplomacy – blockading the mouth of the Congo until reforms were effected – would 
be nothing less than ‘an act of war’.54 Instead, the British government hoped to persuade the 
Belgian government to take over the royal demesne. In 1906, the British government, now with a 
more aggressive foreign secretary, confronted the Belgian king with the CRA evidence, but 
Leopold II insisted that his rights in the Congo were ‘personal and indivisible’ and that no other 
‘Power has the right of intervention’.55 When, finally, in 1908, the Belgian government took 
control of the Congo away from the king, this was a significant victory for Casement and the 
CRA. Annexation had ‘placed the whole of the system of administration of the Congo under the 
searchlight of Parliamentary criticism’.56 In turn, then, the Belgian parliament would be shoved 
by continual international pressure to make colonial policy ‘answerable to the Belgian national 
conscience’.57 
Having described how criticisms of colonial practice were developed within the executive 
and articulated in parliament, we now want to establish the specifically anticolonial character of 
Casement’s testimony on the Congo. The coherence of his critique is impressive and it is striking 
that he tried to find both within colonial administration itself and British liberalism more broadly 
the principles upon which to base it. From colonial administration, he drew an array of rights 
possessed by colonial subjects and from British liberalism he developed an extensive set of 
obligations to prevent injustice and injury. These led him to the conclusion that there could be 
no principled colonialism since it rested upon the sins of dispossession and the brutal extraction 
of primary exports. After this, his route to Irish rebellion was direct and it gave him his final 
platform – his judicial moment – from which to speak about these solidarities. 
SUBJECT RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In claiming colonies, the British made subjects of the inhabitants and as those people crossed 
borders they took this status with them. Across the world, British consuls had a responsibility to 
look after the rights and interests of British subjects and although the realm of the consul had 
once been largely commercial by the later nineteenth century it increasingly encompassed welfare 
and intelligence matters.58 In the Congo, Africans who were British subjects were employed in 
the armed forces that were used to force natives to ‘mortally’ slash the rubber trees, while other 
British subjects were employed as labourers building infrastructure for the rubber business, 
plying trade in rubber and serving as missionaries.59 This gave Casement plenty of scope in his 
reports to the civil servants in the Foreign Office. At one point he reported that one British 
subject from West Africa, in the Congo on a two-year labour contract, had been bludgeoned to 
death by a European overseer.60 With its responsibilities outside Britain’s formal empire, the 
consular service was drawn into adjudicating the justice of other colonialisms and, implicitly via 
the accumulation of parallels, of colonialism in general. 
With and sometimes without an interpreter Casement resolved to work by negotiation 
rather than force in his dealings with African people. Recalling his own time with Casement on 
the Congo coast, Joseph Conrad wrote: ‘He knows the coast languages well. I went with him 
several times on short expeditions to hold “palavers” with neighbouring village-chiefs’.61 But 
indigenous testimony was not readily accepted in London and was dismissed by one civil servant 
as no more than ‘vague rumours and hearsay reports’.62 Casement also noted local understanding 
of European prejudice: ‘[W]e begged the white man to leave us alone, saying we could get no 
more rubber, but the white men and their soldiers said: “Go! You are only beasts yourselves, you 
are nyama (meat)”’.63 The Congo government was quick to dismiss his report as an ‘easy 
accumulation not of facts, simple, precise, and verified, but of the declarations and affirmations 
of natives’.64 But even a commission sent out by Leopold II had eventually to accept local claims 
when a missionary, John Harris, ‘brought canoe load after canoe load of witnesses’.65  
Casement believed his local informants from the start and he wanted both to get them 
justice and to end the system under which they suffered, and in this he was not limited by the 
reach of British subjecthood. When he learned of Germans hiring Dahomeans who were later 
accused of killing natives in the German colony of Cameroon, he insisted that the local British 
consul write in protest to the German government for ‘we all on earth have a commission and a 
right to defend the weak against the strong’.66 Writing in 1911 about this broader conception of 
human rights he told Alice Stopford Green, an Irish nationalist and historian that he had 
befriended during their work together for the CRA, ‘If we free the Congo slave we smite the 
Mexican slaver – international humanity is the only check to international financial greed’.67 
However, this comprehensive notion of international human rights was not something that the 
British government accepted. In its communications with the Congo and Belgian governments, 
the British government distanced itself from the CRA and from the heat of public opinion. In 
1909, after annexation, the foreign secretary told the Belgians that ‘the British Government was 
not responsible for anything said by the Congo Reform Association’.68 Yet, the arrangement 
described by Casement was easily described as slavery and this made it a matter of human rights 
and not just treaty rights since the British government had committed itself to the global 
elimination of the slave trade in 1807.69 In this spirit, the archbishop of Canterbury told the 
House of Lords that it was ‘unquestionably true that negro slavery has been resuscitated ... in the 
Congo’, and thus they were ‘face to face with the big principles of right and wrong’.70 
Casement actually made very little reference to slavery in his own report. He gave the 
regime of Leopold II credit for expelling Arab slave traders from the region, commenting that 
‘the suppression of an open form of slave dealing has been an undoubted gain’, but he also 
noted that the army quashing this trade was recruited in a manner ‘little removed from the 
malpractices that service was designed to suppress’.71 Yet the terms of the Berlin Act gave 
Casement an opening for a broader review that explicitly brought colonialism itself into question. 
By Article VI of Chapter I of the Berlin Act, ‘the Powers bound themselves to watch over the 
preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their 
moral and material well-being’.72  
Casement noted that a regime that could only get rubber by force was rotten to its core. 
Though many Europeans believed that Africans were lazy and had to learn the moral benefits of 
hard work, Casement took this argument and stood it on its head: ‘If the labour be unhealthy, 
demoralizing and only possible in a compromising environment the character of the labourer 
and therefore of the nation to which he belongs is deteriorated’.73 Here it was the nature of the 
work, not the native, that produces cowed and demoralized subjects. Moreover, in the Congo, as 
Casement was aware, the Belgian crown appropriated all land that it decided was not under 
individual occupation, and then declared that the local people owed a labour duty as a tax 
towards the costs of administering the occupation and expropriation. Casement questioned both 
the right of the Congo government and the capacity of local chiefs to consent to such an 
arrangement. 
One civil servant, Harry Farnall, sounded an alarm, suggesting that it would be ‘out of the 
question to limit the powers of a civilised government to those of the native chiefs’, because the 
‘British crown claims the right to dispose of vacant land both in colonies and in Protectorates’. 
The foreign secretary himself recognized Casement’s argument as ‘valuable and interesting’, even 
if it ‘proves too much’.74 But the British government retained quite a bit of Casement’s argument 
in its own commentary upon the injustice of the Domaine de la Couronne: 
His Majesty’s Government in no way deny either that the State has the right 
to partition the State lands among bona fide occupants, or that the natives 
will, as the land is so divided out among bona fide occupiers, lose their right 
of roaming over it and collecting the natural fruits which it produces. But; 
His Majesty’s Government maintain that until unoccupied land is reduced 
into individual occupation, and so long as the produce can only be collected 
by the native, the native should be free to dispose of that produce as he 
pleases.75 
This imagines a transition from collective, native occupation to owner-occupier farmers such as 
happened in very few colonies, but it is clear that Casement’s argument was heard as an attack on 
colonialism tout court. Castigating individual evil-doers might have allowed the force of the 
criticism to be contained, whereas, focusing upon a system invited strategic comparisons and 
judicious appraisal. For example, in explaining to Dilke the government’s hesitation to push 
vigorously for a meeting of all the signatories to the Berlin Act, Lansdowne, as Foreign Secretary, 
worried that it might reopen the whole geopolitical arrangement in Central Africa, ‘which would 
not be in our interest’. France was reluctant to join such a conference for fear of drawing 
attention to its own colonial practices in its Congo territories.76 In one minute of 1905, 
Lansdowne conceded that the Congo regime was ‘[g]hastly but I am afraid the Belgians will get 
hold of the stories as to the way the natives have apparently been treated by men of our race in 
Australia’.77 In this respect, then, the humanitarian claims of the Berlin Act created space for a 
civil servant to elaborate his own commentary upon colonialism, an attack that, as we 
demonstrate below, drew upon his understanding of British colonialism in Ireland but developed 
it as a systematic, even theoretical, argument.78  
In 1911, looking back on the Congo from his later work against a similar regime in 
Putumayo, Casement concluded that ‘the same game of land confiscation [was] the key in both 
cases’. In a contemporaneous letter he put the matter more forcefully: ‘The expropriation of the 
Indians, and bare-faced denial of all rights in land to the Indians is at the bottom of the whole 
system of slavery that undoubtedly exists in those [Amazonian] regions’. He made the same 
point to the Foreign Office, blaming Europeans who took ‘no account whatsoever of ... pre-
existent native rights and long-established methods of existence’. In this case, the British 
government had a duty to ensure good conduct because the Peruvian Amazon Company (PAC) 
was registered on the London stock exchange and Casement insisted that it had to be 
reconstituted top to bottom ‘to do away with exploitation’ and respect ‘the innate and individual 
rights of the Indians’.79  
During the Congo agitation Casement wrote to the philanthropist who had largely funded 
the campaign: ‘[I]t was only because I was an Irishman that I could understand fully, I think, the 
whole scheme of wrongdoing at work on the Congo’.80 The ‘whole scheme’, then, was founded 
on expropriation and coercion. Casement certainly appreciated that this analysis of the Congo 
question was controversial within the British Foreign Office. As he wrote to Alice Stopford 
Green, an Irish nationalist friend, in 1907: ‘I knew the FO would not understand the thing ... for, 
I realised that I was looking at this tragedy with the eyes of another race – of a people once 
hunted themselves’.81 Although, as he explained to her, living in Africa during the 1890s he had 
broadly accepted that European colonialism was a progressive and civilizing force, his views had 
changed with what he saw of the conduct of the Boer War and particularly of the concentration 
camps set up at its close, and, after that, in ‘those lonely Congo forests where I found Leopold – 
I found also myself – the incorrigible Irishman’.82 He had also used these terms in 1905 when he 
wrote to an Irish MP whom he wished to recruit to the Congo cause: ‘In the light of our past 
history and of all that the native Irish suffered at the hands of exploiters and exterminators we 
should be the last people on earth to take part, today, with those who are playing the same old 
game’.83 In another letter, Casement referred to the Irish as ‘the white slave race of European 
peoples’.84 The notion that Ireland might be underdeveloped in a manner that recalled the least 
civilized parts of the world was not unusual, as David Nally shows in his work on the Great Irish 
Famine, but it was less common to present this as an indictment of British administration rather 
than blame native failings.85 Furthermore, during the public debate sparked by his report on the 
savage exploitation of indigenous people by the PAC, Casement drew an explicit comparison 
between poor administration in Peru and in Ireland, writing a letter to the Irish Independent about 
an outbreak of typhus fever at Lettermullen, County Galway, that called the district an Irish 
Putumayo and lamented the ‘absence of anything like civilised government in that part of the 
world’. Despite subsequent criticism for having exaggerated the public health crisis in the west of 
Ireland, Casement told Green that he thought the comparison had done nothing but good for 
‘widespread public attention has been called to the evil and wicked plight of those poor people – 
a remnant of Cromwellian civilisation sitting in the embers of the hell of Connacht then decreed 
the doomed Irish race’.86  
 The Irish dimension of Casement’s thought is important, and existing studies treat it in 
diverse ways. Bernard Porter, for example, suggests that Casement’s analysis of colonialism was a 
product of his Irish background, where he had learned to hold landlordism accountable for a 
range of socio-economic evils.87 Casement’s Irish nationalism was certainly quickened by the 
example of his fellow Protestant, Charles Parnell, who dominated the 1880s, leading a nationalist 
movement that began as an attack upon landlordism and ended as a campaign for Home Rule. 
Honouring the day of Parnell’s death in 1891, Casement wrote a poem that anticipated the 
realisation of Parnell’s hopes: ‘Through and beyond the breach he living made | Shall Erin pass 
to freedom’.88 Writing of Alice Stopford Green, who, as an historian, wielded significant 
intellectual and political influence over Casement, Pavlakis is sure that ‘her reflexive anti-
imperialism sprang from her sympathy for the plight of her native Ireland’.89 This suggests that it 
was a matter of the heart and not the mind, yet Green developed her ideas through empirical 
research and in this way she educated Casement about their country too. In The Making of Ireland 
and its Undoing, 1200-1600 (1908), she documented long-standing differences between English 
and Irish society, ‘demonstrating the cultural basis for an independent Irish state’. In Irish 
Nationality (1911), she went even further back to argue that whereas England followed the 
example of the Roman Empire and developed a centralised state with a ‘sovereign ... supreme in 
the domain of force and maintenance of order’, the tribal basis of Irish society allowed ‘self-
governing communities, … bound together in a willing confederation’. Casement followed her 
work carefully, praising her ‘magnificent mind’ after reading The Making of Ireland and its Undoing, 
and, in 1911, he was so impressed with Irish Nationality that he floated a scheme to have it ‘sold 
by hand throughout Ireland’.90 In important ways, then, Casement’s nationalism developed from 
his anticolonial activism. 
However, Andrew Porter is convinced that Casement is the very opposite of a coherent 
anticolonial thinker, developing no ‘mature reflections on the general issues involved’.91 Porter 
correctly suggests that Casement offered multiple suggestions for improvements in different 
contexts—sometimes a Catholic missionary effort, sometimes a reformed trading company, and 
sometimes a switch from US to German colonisers – and he is also prescient in relating this to 
Casement’s pragmatism. But this does not mean that Casement did not see a similar set of causes 
manifesting as multiple evils in each of these contexts. Extortion following land expropriation is 
the consistent theme, and it was fed by his knowledge of Irish history. Porter concedes that the 
‘humanitarian strand in British nationalism’ was ‘often unsympathetic … to the nationalisms of 
others’.92 In this regard, the nationalism of the Irish was a particular blind-spot since it rested so 
clearly upon identifying the colonialism of their British neighbours. Richard Kirkland believes 
that this is why Casement poses a particular problem for British opinion: ‘his disavowal of 
Britain disturbs a perception of the British State as self-reforming in its capacity to analyse and 
ultimately discard its adherence to the colonial project through enlightened administration’.93  
As Europe slid towards war, Casement blamed British imperialism for the roiling tumult. 
He argued that by controlling the world’s seas, the British were able to limit the access to world 
markets of their European rivals. Casement said that Britain wanted ‘a Europe divided against 
itself so that England, untroubled by competition, unchecked by challenge, might appropriate 
the market of mankind’. He argued that British control of Ireland was critical to Britain’s 
maritime supremacy and thus Germany had a clear interest in Irish independence: ‘The German 
gateway to a free Atlantic can only be kept open through a free Ireland’.94 As the First World 
War intensified, and at a point when he was in Germany and a British blockade prevented him 
sending cables to co-conspirators in Ireland or the United States, Casement expostulated about 
Britain in the privacy of his diary: ‘This is a fine measure of freedom of communication! My 
God! How much more will the world have to stand from that Bitch and Harlot of the North 
Sea!’95 This brought Casement to his final anticolonial challenge and ended with him expressing 
his mature thought from the dock of a British court. 
SPEAKING FROM THE DOCK 
In November 1913, Casement was involved in founding the Irish Volunteers (IV), a political 
movement and militia committed to defending Irish Home Rule. Home Rule had been promised 
by a bill introduced to the House of Commons in 1912, which was then rejected repeatedly in 
the House of Lords, and also threatened by the Ulster Volunteers (UV), a militia established to 
oppose its implementation. Home Rule for Ireland was finally enshrined in an act of parliament 
in September 1914, but was immediately suspended for the duration of the war with Germany. 
In May 1914, Casement was part of a small group deciding that the IV should buy guns in 
Germany and bring them back into Ireland, which, in defiance of a British ban on the importing 
of guns to Ireland, was achieved on 26 July 1914. Casement had already left Ireland to raise 
funds in North America and the news of the successful gun-running helped him enormously. On 
2 August 1914 Britain declared war against Germany. In Washington DC Casement met the 
German ambassador to the United States and asked that Germany make as statement supporting 
Irish independence.96 By November 1914 Casement was in Germany trying to secure this 
statement, seeking German arms for the Irish revolution, recruiting Irish prisoners of war for an 
Irish Brigade, and asking that displacing British power in Ireland be part of the German war 
plans. He got the statement he wanted but, beyond that, very little German logistical or military 
support.  
The Germans wanted a rebellion in Ireland because it would distract British troops, and 
because its suppression might alienate Irish-American opinion and thereby prevent the United 
States entering the war (the US did not enter the war until April 1917). Neither of these goals 
required that the Irish rebels actually succeed and the German government committed no 
officers or men to the venture. Nevertheless, with two compatriots Roger Casement was landed 
from a submarine onto Banna Strand near Tralee on Good Friday, 21 April 1916. The ship 
bringing arms was not met by the anticipated group of local rebels and after a brief pursuit its 
crew scuttled the boat sending the arms to deep oblivion. Casement had few illusions about the 
likely success of the rebellion, sharing with his diary the belief that it was ‘the maddest and most 
ill planned enterprise in the history of Irish revolutionary efforts’.97 He was arrested near the 
beach and, following a night in police custody in Tralee, he was taken to London. He was 
interrogated and then brought to trial and so began a further episode of publicity, the public 
exercise of justice: the third, and judicial, moment of government. 
Initially, Casement was kept at the Tower of London until authorities decided upon a 
civil rather than a military trial, when he was moved to Brixton prison.98 A civil trial gave the 
maximum publicity and aimed to allow justice to be seen to have been done. However, it also 
gave the accused an opportunity to defend themselves. Many speeches from the dock have been 
celebrated and affective as expressions of Irish nationalism and defiance. Perhaps the most 
famous of these was Robert Emmet’s, after sentence of death was passed for his part in the 
rebellion of 1803 and specifically for the treasonous act of having sought French assistance in 
liberating Ireland. He said that the British judges were quite unable to understand his motives 
but instead he addressed a future when in a free Ireland people might openly avow the principles 
for which he now surrendered his life: ‘Let no man write my epitaph: for as no man who knows 
my motives dare now vindicate them, let not prejudice or ignorance asperse them’.99 In all sorts 
of ways, Casement modeled himself on Emmet, a fellow Protestant seeking foreign assistance in 
the struggle to expel tyranny from Ireland.100 It is striking that the German authorities gave a 
copy of Emmet’s speech to Casement in April 1916, preparing him perhaps for the fate they 
anticipated.101 
A state trial for treason is a complex matter and Casement had neither the stamina nor 
legal training to conduct his own defence. Unfortunately, no leading British barrister would act 
for him either and when the Irish barrister George Gavan Duffy offered to help Casement his 
partners in his London law firm threatened to dissolve their enterprise, which they subsequently 
did.102 A relatively junior Irish lawyer, Alexander Sullivan, agreed to lead the defence. Casement 
faced not only a court in a country at war, but also some of the more extreme Unionists of the 
day. His interrogation had been led in part by Major Frank Hall who had been organising gun-
running for the UV until he joined MI5 at the start of the war.103 In court, he faced the attorney 
general, Frederick (F.E.) Smith, so hostile to Irish nationalism that he not only visited Ireland to 
inspect the militia of the UV, but in a speech of 12 July 1912 went so far as to suggest that 
resisting Home Rule was ‘one of those supreme issues of conscience amid which the ordinary 
landmarks of permissible resistance to technical laws are submerged’.104 The lead prosecutor as 
lord chief justice was George Cave, another Unionist Conservative. Between them Smith and 
Cave tried to limit the frame of reference within which the case for Casement could be made.  
When Sullivan tried to establish that the Irish Volunteers might have been arming in 
response to the earlier determination of the UV to arm themselves and to defy by force the 
introduction of Home Rule, even though that be the law, Cave interrupted with ‘Have we not 
gone far enough into this?’ to which Sullivan replied meekly ‘Very well, my lord, I at once accept 
the suggestion’. And when Cave referred again to arms imported by Unionists, Smith himself 
intervened to insist that these were statements ‘wholly uncorroborated’ and both Cave and 
Sullivan supported the intervention. By restricting Sullivan early in the trial, Smith and Cave 
limited what he could use in his summing up since many of the points he wanted to make had 
not previously been entered in evidence. The badgering of Sullivan left him in pieces and he 
retired, saying that he was ‘completely broken down’. When Artemus Jones, as substitute for 
Sullivan, was given like treatment he allowed himself this mild sarcasm: ‘One eminent judge once 
observed that a thing most notorious outside a Court of law was the thing most difficult to 
prove inside a Court of law’. The entity that was conjured away during the trial was the thing 
most dear to Casement: Irish nationality. Smith and Cave insisted that the trial was about treason 
in time of war. It was a matter between Britain and Germany and what had to be decided was 
whether Casement, by embarrassing or distracting Britain in time of war, ‘a weakening of the 
forces of the King’, were not aiding Germany in a zero-sum game.105  
Casement’s sexual relations with other men were known to the British government. He 
told his legal team that should his character be brought into question ‘I must bear it – and carry 
the war into their camp by saying “alright – you knew all that long ago, yet you suggested my 
return to your service on 26 October 1914”’.106 But all involved knew that it would reduce 
sympathy for him were it made public and avoiding cross-examination that might have alluded to 
his sexuality is likely one reason why Casement was not called in his own defence. Sexually 
explicit entries from one of Casement’s diaries – discovered at his digs in London – were 
photographed and circulated widely. Newspaper articles began to drop hints and prominent 
allies privately abandoned him. Indeed, the notion that a diary might be relevant to the case was 
trailed by an exchange of almost music hall banter between Smith and Cave as each insisted that 
they were not introducing a diary explicitly into the trial since they could not be sure it was 
Casement’s. While the diary they were alluding to was just a document that listed Casement’s 
movements in Germany, the way Smith and Cave noted that there was a ‘diary which was found, 
and is in evidence as having been found’, offered sufficient ambiguity to suggest that the 
compromising diary was also in evidence.107 As Ernly Blackwell advised the British cabinet when 
it was debating commuting the capital penalty: ‘His private character is by this time pretty 
generally known in London. The Daily Express on three occasions has openly stated he is a moral 
degenerate, addicted to unmentionable offences, and has cited his “diaries” in proof’.108 
George Bernard Shaw told the Casement team that their only hope was to produce a 
defence that might at least divide the jury, and that confusion might be fomented by appealing as 
an Irishman to themselves as Englishmen: 
I advised Casement to conduct his own defence; to plead not guilty but admit 
all the facts; to assert his complete right to act as he had done; to claim that 
as he was a prisoner of war and not a traitor his execution would be a 
murder; to be eloquent about his right to take up arms for the independence 
of his country; and to finish with a defiant ‘Now murder me if you like and 
be damned’.109 
There was some faint echo of this in Sullivan’s intercession when he asserted that: ‘The prisoner 
is not a countryman of yours. ... He comes from another country where people, though they use 
the same words, perhaps, speak differently; they think differently; they act differently’.110 But this 
was even less nationalist than Shaw’s proposal. Casement’s own speech, which he gave only after 
sentence was passed, was not only nationalist, like Shaw’s proposal, but also militantly 
anticolonial. 
Casement stressed that nationalism was a matter of conscience, and that it was barbaric 
to punish people for their beliefs. Modern government should be based on something better, on 
loyalty freely given, on rights fully recognised. Casement’s central argument was about the 
difference between restraint and loyalty: ‘Loyalty is a sentiment, not a law. It rests on love, not 
on restraint. The Government of Ireland by England rests on restraint and not on law; and since 
it demands no love it can evoke no loyalty’. Casement professed that English liberty rested upon 
trial by one’s peers: ‘With all respect I assert this Court is to me, an Irishman, not a jury of my 
peers’. Casement noted that the Crown’s case effectively erased Ireland and Irish identity: ‘[F]or 
the Attorney-General of England there is only “England” – there is no Ireland, there is only the 
law of England – no right of Ireland; the liberty of Ireland and of Irishmen is to be judged by the 
power of England’. The fact that the English would not trust a jury of Irish people to convict 
Casement was proof of the illegitimacy of their claim to rule:  
That, my lord, is the condemnation of English rule, of English-made law, of 
English Government in Ireland, that it dare not rest on the will of the Irish 
people, but it exists in defiance of their will – that it is a rule derived not 
from right, but from conquest. Conquest, my lord, gives no title, and if it 
exists over the body, it fails over the mind. It can exert no empire over men’s 
reason and judgment and affections. 
In the context of a war to defend the British Empire, Casement had a different allegiance: 
That blessed word ‘Empire’ that bears so paradoxical resemblance to charity! 
For if charity begins at home, ‘Empire’ begins in other men’s homes, and 
both may cover a multitude of sins. I for one was determined that Ireland 
was much more to me than ‘Empire’, and that if charity begins at home so 
must loyalty.111 
So, on one side there was force, conquest and empire, and on the other there was love, 
loyalty, charity and rights. The analysis of coercion that was central to Casement’s understanding 
of colonialism was now at the heart of his final argument about the illegitimate claims of 
colonialism upon his own body: 
Where all your rights become only an accumulated wrong; where men must 
beg with bated breath for leave to subsist in their own land, to think their 
own thoughts, to sing their own songs, to garner the fruits of their own 
labours ... then surely it is braver, a saner and a truer thing, to be a rebel in act 
and deed against such circumstances as these than merely to accept it as the 
natural lot of men.112 
As a rebel, he was subject to the fatal force of the judicial might of an imperial power, but to 
justify his judicial killing Casement had been given a public trial and he took this last opportunity 
to describe the violence, expropriation and illicit character of colonialism, in this case that 
wrought on his own Ireland. 
ANTICOLONIALISM AT THE HEART OF EMPIRE 
Anticolonial sentiments were both incited and repressed at the heart of empire. The consular 
service, as part of the executive moment of governance, took place in non-British territories but, 
in serving British subjects living under the rule of other colonial authorities, British consuls 
might find themselves criticizing the nature of that colonial rule.113 Those criticisms would be 
debated within the civil service back in London and used to inform ministerial statements to 
parliament. In this manner, Casement took up the question of British subjects working as little 
better than indentured servants as part of the rubber extraction enterprises in both the Congo 
and Putumayo. He also found British-registered companies within his bailiwick and held them to 
account for their labour practices. Casement saw consular work as very like diplomacy for, while 
‘consuls were originally intended to ... represent a commercial community’, they now acted on 
behalf of ‘Government, and his official duties take up practically all his time’.114 In that 
diplomatic capacity, Casement took an interest in the obligations implicit in anti-slavery treaties, 
including the diplomacy around the Berlin Act. To some extent this was no more than the ethical 
or ‘alchemical’ humanitarianism, of his contemporaries.115 However, it is important to recognize 
that this was not the limit of Casement’s view. His anticolonialism separated him from these 
varieties of humanitarianism.  
There are several studies that trace the ways that networks of humanitarianism developed 
alongside colonialism and in the main they find a Christian philanthropy that invested empire 
with a civilising mission.116 This was precisely what Casement gave up after his experience during 
the Boer War. He returned to the world-view that had animated his earlier support for the Land 
War against landlordism in Ireland.117 For Casement, land expropriation left indigenous labour 
vulnerable to extortive practices. This had happened in Ireland and it was happening in Congo 
and Putumayo. His minders in the Foreign Office were well aware of the reach of such an 
analysis and sought various formulations that would limit its applicability only to the colonialism 
of others. Yet, both Casement’s reports on rubber indicted a system and not just a few 
miscreants. 
The critical material produced within the executive was ultimately recirculated within the 
debating chambers of the legislature, because the legitimation of action by branches of the 
executive such as the Foreign Office, requires that it be seen to be willing to submit to 
parliamentary and thus public scrutiny. However, the executive can censor reports and delay 
their publication. When Casement briefed journalists in advance of the release of his report on 
the Congo, he was rebuked by the Foreign Office. Yet he wrote at least one anonymous article 
for the press during the Putumayo campaign, reassuring the editor of the Daily News that it was 
safe from any prosecution for libel, and he continually pressured the Foreign Office to publish 
his Putumayo report arguing that reform would only be brought by publicity and the 
‘compulsion of civilised communities’.118 During both campaigns Casement was in London for 
much of the time and spoke privately with activists and members of parliament. In this nexus of 
press and parliament the anticolonial message was squeezed at both ends. The public campaign 
was primarily tied to the Christian philanthropy that Alan Lester, Ian Tyrrell and others have 
described.119 The missionaries were not keen to be public critics of a state that could exclude 
them from their missionary field. In parliament the government of the day was always chary of 
rebuking a European ally and equally wary of allowing any broad criticism of colonialism for fear 
that it might expose British practices to comparable slight. Both these consequences did follow 
and while the references to colonial rule in Ireland were in a minor voice, the colonial character 
of the Congo and of Putumayo was established in ways that invited precisely the more general 
castigation of empire that Casement advanced.  
 Parliament, however, was largely deaf to this appeal and, outside the cabal of Irish 
nationalist MPs, was particularly unlikely to accept an anticolonial case in favour of Irish 
independence. Supporting Casement’s Congo campaign, Dilke, although a radical Liberal, did 
believe in the possibility of a benign empire, even for Ireland. Curzon, on the other hand, 
opposing the Congo reforms, was an imperialist of the purest water who went to India as viceroy 
at the start of 1899. He was also vehemently opposed to Home Rule for Ireland and, in 1886, 
had made his opposition the subject of a maiden speech in the House of Commons.120 As noted 
previously, F.E. Smith was trenchant in resisting Irish Home Rule in 1916, but he was also the 
most extreme of imperialists in general terms, viewing colonial rule as a progressive and 
evolutionary principle in human history: ‘nations of stronger fibre, confronted by indigenous 
weaklings, have always asserted the right of forcible expropriation. No one ... who has studied 
the history of the world has ever defended the view that the supreme interest of evolutionary 
humanity can support a definitive delimitation for all time of the surface of the world’.121 In 
generalizing an anticolonial message from his reports, and particularly in extending it to the Irish 
case, Casement faced serious obstacles in his interactions with both the executive and legislative 
moments of governance. 
Even within Irish nationalism, Casement’s anticolonial voice was far from universal. 
Indeed, as he was told by William Scawen Blunt, the constitutional nationalist John Redmond 
considered Casement ‘a dangerous revolutionist, being anti-imperialist’.122 Of course, Redmond 
was right and Casement came to make common cause with the rebels in the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, a clandestine revolutionary group that infiltrated the leadership council of the Irish 
Volunteers. Casement brought himself to the point in the First World War where he sought 
assistance from Britain’s enemy, Germany, and landed himself in court on a charge of high 
treason. At this point his anticolonial message echoed through the third, the judicial, moment of 
governance. Following a charge of treason rather than rebellion, Casement got a public trial in 
London, rather than a secret court-martial in Ireland. It was not military justice but, rather, civil 
justice that arraigned Roger Casement. Once again, the organs of government engaged publicity 
and, despite the asymmetry of relations, the Irish man had to be heard. In one final performance, 
one of those ‘weapons of the weak’, Casement brought colonialism’s violence into public view.123 
His argument was that British rule in Ireland rested upon coercion not consent, and the evident 
partisanship of his accusers plus the raucous hostility of the general public in London support 
his claim. As he was led from his cell to the scaffold a baying mob outside the prison assailed 
him, causing at least one newspaper to question the much-vaunted British civilisation: ‘The 
cheers of that London mob, on that beautiful August morning when all creation was joyous with 
the joy of living will re-echo from every civilised nation in the world a wail of horror and disgust. 
It is one of those terrible blots which will stain with an indelible stain the fame of the great 
British Empire for ever’.124 Yet Casement’s argument that the social order must be based on love 
to command loyalty was not lost on all who read his final speech. In his cosmopolitan reading of 
sexuality and nationality, James Joyce gave to his favourite character, Leopold Bloom, a speech 
very like Casement’s when, under attack from nationalist bigots, Bloom responds: 
– But it’s no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all that. That’s not life for 
men and women, insult and hatred. And everybody knows that it’s the very 
opposite of that that is really life.  
– What? says Alf.  
– Love, says Bloom.125 
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